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Demonstrating value: how entrepreneurs design new accounting 
methods to justify innovations 
An important activity of entrepreneurs is to justify the value of an innovation to gain 
support from stakeholders. We examine how entrepreneurs can develop an accounting 
methodology to demonstrate the value of a proposed innovation, focusing on the case of 
a charitable foundation’s promotion of social enterprise and its efforts to develop the 
accounting methodology of Social Return on Investment (SROI). We show how the 
process for designing new accounting methods that helps in demonstrating the value of 
innovations involves entrepreneurs (1) imagining the expectations of their stakeholders 
(2) putting in place the necessary infrastructure through which numbers can be generated 
and (3) iteratively reconfiguring the accounting methodology and the espoused value the 
innovation is expected to generate. Our study furthers understanding of the role of 
accounting numbers in the entrepreneurial process, particularly in situations where 
entrepreneurs seek to generate new accounting methodologies to develop persuasive 
stories about the benefits of their innovations. 
Keywords: innovation, accounting, entrepreneurial storytelling, social enterprise, 
social return on investment. 
Introduction 
An important activity of entrepreneurs is to communicate convincingly the potential 
value of an envisioned innovation to obtain support from important stakeholders (Seo & 
Creed, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Etzion & 
Ferraro, 2010; David et al., 2013). The value in this context, the literature indicates, is 
the perceived merit, usefulness or desirability of the innovation in the eyes of such 
stakeholders, with entrepreneurs aiming for the proposed innovation to become ‘taken- 
for-granted as a social fact’ (Rao et al., 2000, p. 242). Effective communication is 
crucial in bringing about support from such stakeholders (e.g. allocating resources) and 
thus increasing the chances of the innovation being realised. Studies show how 
entrepreneurs can work discursively to present the potential merits of a proposal and 
convince stakeholder to agree with their presentation by aligning such presentation with 
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the stakeholders’ existing preferences and routines (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; 
David et al., 2013). Importantly, however, prior research has presumed that 
entrepreneurs typically face difficulties in demonstrating the perceived value of an 
innovation to stakeholders (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; David et al., 2013).  
A number of empirical examples indicate that pioneers of innovations can also 
engage in efforts to mobilise measured outputs as part of their efforts to demonstrate the 
value of their proposed changes. Recent research shows that, for example, entrepreneurs 
in the field of microfinance gathered data aimed at demonstrating how loans to women 
improved their economic welfare (Banerjee et al., 2015) and entrepreneurs developed a 
new stock market index to demonstrate the financial return of socially responsible 
investing (Déjean et al., 2004). More broadly, it is recognized that organizations are 
increasingly subject to pressures to use numbers to demonstrate their value to external 
audiences (e.g., Porter, 1995; Espeland & Sauder, 2007), where accounting numbers can 
be persuasive as part of discussions and debates about particular proposals or 
viewpoints (e.g., Kenno & Free, 2018; Goretzki et al., 2018; Christensen & 
Skærbæk, 2007; Kadous et al., 2005; Englund & Gerdin, 2015). 
While the existing literature on persuasiveness analyses the dynamics involved 
in reusing and reframing existing accounting numbers, it provides us with little 
analytical insight when it comes to entrepreneurial activity. This is primarily due to the 
fact that entrepreneurs who aim to communicate convincingly to stakeholders the merits 
of a yet-unrealised innovation typically also operate in settings where useable 
accounting numbers do not exist. This motivates us to ask how such entrepreneurs aim 
to use numbers to bring about positive views among stakeholders regarding the value of 
their proposed innovation. Power (2015, p. 45) suggests that infrastructures that 
facilitate the generation of new accounting numbers are ‘the often invisible and 
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neglected ground of visible accounting methodology.’ We agree with this call for 
making accounting infrastructures, and the dynamics through which they come about, 
more visible. Thus, to address the question of how entrepreneurs generate persuasive 
accounting numbers, we aim to identify the infrastructures that are developed and 
utilised to support the generation of a persuasive entrepreneurial narrative that attempts 
to demonstrate the value of an innovation.  
We examine the case of a charitable foundation’s promotion of the social 
enterprise as an innovation (Tracey et al., 2011), and its related efforts to develop an 
accounting methodology. These efforts faced challenges as the value generated by 
social enterprises were deemed not compatible with the information compiled by 
existing accounting methodologies. This, in turn, motivated the entrepreneurs to 
develop an infrastructure that facilitated the collection, compilation, communication and 
analysis of new accounting numbers, in what would eventually become Social Return 
on Investment (SROI). As the entrepreneurs began doing so, however, especially as the 
design progressed and the methodology became more concrete, a significant 
transformation took place, not only in the accounting methodology but also a change in 
perception of the nature of value associated with the work of the social enterprises. 
Our analysis shows that as the entrepreneurs sought to communicate effectively 
the merits of their innovation, and, as part of these efforts, aimed to demonstrate the 
value of social enterprises with SROI, they faced three challenges in developing a new 
(rather than deploying an existing) accounting methodology. (1) Rather than being able 
to draw on prior experience in dealing with stakeholders, entrepreneurs faced the 
challenge of imagining what types of numbers may be regarded as persuasive by the 
stakeholders from which the entrepreneurs wish to gain support for their innovation (c.f. 
Garud et al., 2014; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). (2) To move from their imagined 
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methodology to its actual operationalisation (c.f. Hopwood, 1987; Briers & Chua, 2001; 
Chua, 1995; Andon et al., 2007; Power, 2015), entrepreneurs needed to mobilise 
resources such as money, time, and expertise to develop the infrastructure of the new 
accounting method. This dynamic stands in contrast with focusing efforts on framing 
and interpreting existing accounting numbers, which is commonly examined in the 
accounting literature. (3) The iterative and experimental nature of the development 
process (c.f. Garud et al., 2014; Briers & Chua, 2001; Chua, 1995; Andon et al., 2007) 
meant that the entrepreneurs faced ongoing challenges in reconfiguring both the 
accounting methodology and the espoused value their innovation is expected to 
generate.  
Our study makes three contributions. First, we examine the roles that accounting 
numbers play in the entrepreneurial process, particularly where entrepreneurs aim to 
build persuasive arguments by developing new accounting methodologies rather than 
rely on existing numbers (e.g., Kenno & Free, 2018; Goretzki et al., 2018; Kadous et 
al., 2005; Englund & Gerdin, 2015). We show how the process of designing new 
accounting methods that help to demonstrate the benefits of innovations is qualitatively 
different from repurposing existing accounting numbers. This difference revolves 
around entrepreneurs (1) imagining the expectations of their stakeholders (2) putting in 
place the necessary infrastructure through which the numbers could be generated and 
(3) iteratively reconfiguring the accounting methodology and the espoused value the 
innovation is expected to generate. Importantly, we show how initial narratives about 
the future benefits of a proposed innovation are confronted with the constraints of 
realising the desired accounting methodology - as a result, both the accounting 
methodology, and, critically, the innovation itself, are reshaped. 
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Second, we contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial storytelling (e.g., 
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007; Garud et al., 2014; Manning & 
Bejarano, 2017) by developing understanding of the role of numbers in generating 
persuasive stories about the benefits of innovations. Although this literature 
acknowledges that entrepreneurs change and revise their stories, it only links such 
changes and revisions to setbacks in the entrepreneurial venture itself (Garud et al., 
2014). Instead, we show how entrepreneurial storytelling is better understood as an 
iterative process, involving on-going oscillation between the shape of the 
entrepreneurial innovation and the trials and experiments involved in producing 
persuasive stories about the innovation’s benefits. From this perspective, not only do 
setbacks in the entrepreneurial venture lead to revised stories about the its benefits, but 
setbacks in the development of persuasive stories can lead to revisions to the shape of 
the innovation itself.  
 Third, we contribute to literature on accounting innovation (e.g., Hopwood, 
1987; Miller, 1991; Jones & Dugdale, 1998, 2002; Power, 2015; Cooper et al., 2017) by 
focusing directly on the ‘local laboratories’ (Cooper et al., 2017, p. 1004) from which 
accounting innovations emerge. This focus is important as the conditions surrounding 
the early stages in the innovation process can shape the initial contours of the 
accounting innovation in ways that persist long after it has left the local laboratory. In 
this way, analysing the inception stages of the accounting innovation process can 
provide us with more complete understanding of the beginnings of new accountings 
(Power, 2015). In particular, we show how new accountings can begin as part of a 
proactive process owing to entrepreneurial innovation at a localised level rather than as 
a response to the formation and elaboration of new objects at the field level (Power, 
2015). Our study also shows how the phases in the emergence of new accounting forms 
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may influence each other dynamically and recursively over time (c.f., Power, 2015), 
pointing to the ways in which challenges in developing accounting infrastructure can 
influence and potentially even transform object formation and elaboration.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we 
review research on entrepreneurs’ efforts aimed at gaining support for their innovations. 
We examine how much of the existing research has been directed at analysing the 
discourse entrepreneurs generate, while relatively little attention has been given to the 
conditions that underpin the generation of such efforts. We use our discussion to 
highlight a gap in our knowledge regarding the role that accounting plays in innovation 
processes by demonstrating the future benefits of the proposed innovation. The third 
section outlines our data and methods, with the fourth section presenting our analysis 
from the empirical study. The fifth section discusses our findings, with the final section 
outlining our contributions and their implications for future research. 
Demonstrating the value of an innovation  
From rhetoric to numbers 
To gain legitimacy for their new innovation, entrepreneurs need to convince 
stakeholders that their vision of the future has the possibility of coming to fruition, and 
can do so by conveying the innovation’s future characteristics as well as the future 
benefits that might accrue to stakeholders (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Garud et al., 
2014). Prior literature assumes that this process is based on entrepreneurs successfully 
mobilizing a rhetorical narrative through which they exhibit the innovation to important 
stakeholders (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007; Manning & Bejarano, 
2017). To be persuasive, the rhetorical narrative needs to addresses the expectations of 
the potential stakeholder ‘recruits’, which can be achieved by highlighting the 
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innovation’s cognitive, pragmatic and/or normative value (Strang & Meyer, 1993; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Addressing stakeholder expectations may prove 
difficult, however, as the stakeholders can question the plausibility and value of the 
venture and may not comprehend the suggested future changes, especially when such 
changes differ significantly from their experience. As such, as part of their rhetorical 
efforts, entrepreneurs may seek to convince stakeholders by developing projective 
stories whereby they imaginatively generate possible future trajectories of action and 
suggest various permutations of the innovation’s manifestation (Garud et al., 2014; 
Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Such stories may prove to be credible and convincing to 
stakeholders when the storylines portray vivid accounts of future possibilities, the steps 
required to reach the desired outcomes, as well as connect to expectations of the future 
the stakeholders are already familiar with (Manning & Bejarano, 2017; Garud et al., 
2014; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).  
Although noting the importance of artefacts and evaluation routines (Garud et 
al., 2014), prior research on entrepreneurial storytelling has largely overlooked the 
conditions under which such narratives become persuasive. One of the ways in which 
entrepreneurs can aim to make their narrative more persuasive is through using or even 
relying on numerical representations as a central part of their communications to 
stakeholders (Dansou & Langley, 2013). This insight, in turn, is rooted in empirical 
observations indicating numerical data’s perceived authority as an independent, rational, 
and objective source of knowledge about the social world (Porter, 1995), where it tends 
to be taken as a given that ‘people find numbers credible ways of knowing and 
communicating’ (Espeland & Sauder, 2007, p. 417). In addition, accounting research, 
particularly studies examining accountants as agents of change in organisations (e.g., 
Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Busco et al., 2006), shows how accounting numbers are 
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used as part of attempts to generate convincing arguments for change. For example, 
accounting numbers can be pitted against other forms of information in public policy 
debates (Hall & Millo, 2018); are used by managers to make other numbers more 
persuasive (Englund & Gerdin, 2015), or as raw materials in a process of sense-giving 
(Jordan & Messner, 2012). Actors also draw on accounting numbers to make persuasive 
arguments for different courses of action, such as particular investment proposals 
(Kadous et al., 2005), bargaining positions (Kenno & Free, 2017) or interpretations of 
performance (Goretzki et al., 2018).  
Prior studies also suggest that entrepreneurs do undertake projects to develop 
new numbers in order to promote their innovations. Empirical examples include the area 
of Socially Responsible Investing, where proponents developed a new stock market 
index to demonstrate that socially and environmentally responsible companies could 
generate comparable financial return to traditionally selected stocks (Déjean et al., 
2004), sustainability advocates who developed the Global Reporting Initiative and other 
rankings to demonstrate the worth of socially responsible businesses (Etzion & Ferraro, 
2010; Bermiss et al., 2013), methods for measuring and valuing social impact to justify 
policy changes (Franks & Vanclay, 2013, Aledo et al., 2015), and a national survey to 
promote happiness as a policy objective (Bates, 2009; McBain & Alsamawi, 2014). In 
these examples, absent appropriate and ready-made numbers, entrepreneurs seek to 
develop and establish new methods that can be used in persuading stakeholders of the 
characteristics and benefits of the proposed innovation. 
The challenges in generating new numbers 
Importantly, as entrepreneurs attempt to design and put in place new accounting 
methods through which persuasive numbers would be generated, we suspect they are 
likely to face different challenges from the ones commonly faced by actors drawing on 
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existing numbers. Whilst the numbers drawn upon by the actors may be complex and 
thus require significant effort to make them persuasive for others, the potential 
challenge of producing the numbers in the first instance does not feature as a salient 
issue in these contexts. As such, the challenge for actors in drawing on existing numbers 
is mainly one of framing, interpretation and positioning. For example, convincing others 
that the numbers are objective and prepared competently (Kadous et al., 2005), and that 
they are legitimate, salient and appropriate to the discussions and negotiations at hand 
(Goretzki et al., 2018, Kenno & Free, 2018).  
In contrast, an entrepreneur’s vision of the future can often be difficult to 
communicate because appropriate artefacts and evaluation routines (e.g., accounting 
methods) have yet to materialise (Garud et al., 2014). This is complicated further by the 
fact that existing accounting methodologies are usually part of prevailing norms and 
routines, so entrepreneurs may find that such numbers cannot be mobilised or 
contextualized effectively to communicate their new vision, particularly where the 
proposed value of their innovation may not be reflected (or reflected appropriately) in 
the existing accounting information systems that are available (Hopwood, 1987; Power, 
2015). As such, rather than repurpose existing numbers, entrepreneurs may need to 
imagine possible future accounting methods that they conjecture stakeholders would 
find persuasive (c.f. Garud et al., 2014; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). This task is likely 
to be quite challenging as entrepreneurs need to imagine the ways in which the 
accounting method and its outputs could convey the characteristics and benefits of a yet 
non-existent innovation and do so in ways that stakeholders would find plausible and 
credible (cf. Garud et al., 2014).  
The material dimension of the new accounting method also means entrepreneurs 
are likely to face challenges in mobilising resources. This is because in order to generate 
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a persuasive narrative that uses an accounting method, the entrepreneurs need to 
establish the infrastructure that would make possible such generation of information 
(i.e. by collecting, compiling and aggregating data) and then presenting that information 
in ways that help to sustain the credibility of the narrative. Prior accounting research 
indicates that putting in place this necessary infrastructure is a non-trivial task. For 
example, Hopwood (1987) recounts how, for Wedgewood, moving from the idea of cost 
to the ability to produce calculations of the cost of products was not easy. As no 
established procedures were available, the evidence of costing had to be laboriously 
created rather than simply being revealed by existing systems. Existing information 
systems may not collect the data that is required (Andon et al., 2007; Briers & Chua, 
2001), leading to substantial efforts to construct new data items, and reconfigure and 
reconstruct existing data to fit the demands of the new method (Briers & Chua, 2001; 
Chua, 1995; Andon et al., 2007). For example, Power (2015) shows how existing 
systems could not produce effectively the information needed to operationalise the new 
category to be accounted for, prompting the creation of new roles (e.g., impact officers), 
information systems (e.g., collecting evidence of impact) and governance structures 
(e.g., peer review of impact case studies) to bring this about. Thus, operationalising the 
concept of research ‘impact’ required extensive infrastructure to be put in place in order 
to produce impact accounts.  
It is important to note that a process of developing a new accounting method 
may also not proceed in a straightforward, linear fashion where entrepreneurs simply 
bring about their imagined accounting method (albeit with challenges and difficulties). 
Rather, entrepreneurs may need to go through a process of ongoing experimentation and 
trial and error (Briers & Chua, 2001; Chua, 1995; Andon et al., 2007; Jones & Dugdale, 
2002; Cooper et al., 2017). For example, as they expose their initial formulations of the 
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proposed accounting method to stakeholders, entrepreneurs may realise that their beliefs 
about the kinds of methods and numbers stakeholders might find convincing were not 
correct or require modification, or that the espoused benefits of the innovation turn out 
to be difficult to demonstrate with their proposed accounting method. Conversely, 
entrepreneurs may fail to mobilise a sufficient quantity and/or type of resources needed 
to put their imagined accounting method into practice. In this situation, resource 
constraints can shape the ways in which the accounting method is developed, both 
limiting possibilities but also potentially prompting innovation to make the new 
accounting practice work (Andon et al., 2007).  
Building on the literature on the persuasive power of accounting numbers, we 
focus on situations where entrepreneurs, as part of their efforts to persuade stakeholders 
to agree on a proposed future benefits of an innovation, take part in generating new 
accounting numbers to demonstrate the value of innovations, typically because usable 
accounting numbers do not exist or existing numbers are not appropriate. As they 
engage in these efforts, prior literature suggests that entrepreneurs can face challenges 
in imagining a new accounting method that stakeholders will find persuasive, and in 
mobilising resources to develop the necessary infrastructure to operationalise their new 
method. Finally, this process is likely to involve ongoing experimentation and trial and 
error as the entrepreneurs seek to bring about an accounting method that can 
persuasively demonstrate the value of the innovation to stakeholders. To understand 
how entrepreneurs design new accounting methods to demonstrate the value of an 
innovation, we conduct a qualitative, historical case study of REDF, a nonprofit 
organization committed to addressing the innovative use of social enterprises to solve 
the problem of homelessness in the Bay Area of San Francisco, and its development of 
a new accounting methodology, Social Return on Investment (SROI).  
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Research design  
The case  
The Roberts Enterprise Development Fund (REDF), which was originally formed under 
another name by the Roberts Foundation in 1990, sought to gain support for the new 
organizational form of the social enterprise – a for-profit company, each one owned and 
managed by a nonprofit, that provided employment training and opportunities – as the 
preferred vehicle to assist homeless individuals. Part of this process involved 
developing what would become SROI, a new accounting methodology for use by the 
nonprofit and its membership of funded social enterprises, as a means to demonstrate 
the social and economic value of social enterprises to key stakeholders.  
Whilst prior studies have examined issues surrounding the use of SROI, such as 
challenges in its implementation (Arvidson et al., 2013; Arvidson & Lyon, 2014; Maier 
et al., 2015) or the content and structure of SROI reports (Krlev et al., 2013), very few 
studies have examined how the methodology was developed (but see Hall et al., 2015; 
Hall & Millo, 2018). Given our research questions, we focus our empirical attention not 
on the application of SROI but on entrepreneurs’ efforts to construct the SROI 
methodology itself. 
Data sources  
As Hopwood (1987, p. 214) laments, ‘it is rarely possible to witness the birth pains of a 
newly emergent accounting.’ In a similar vein, we became aware of the case of REDF 
and SROI only after the fact, thus precluding our direct observation of events as they 
unfolded in real time. As such, like Hopwood, we seek to examine the development of 
SROI indirectly, drawing on multiple sources of data, including numerous documents 
pertaining to the development of the SROI methodology and secondary scholarship. 
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Unlike Hopwood and the case of Wedgewood, however, we were able to undertake 
interviews with key actors involved in the development of SROI at REDF given that the 
method had emerged relatively recently. At the first stage of data collection, using 
existing historical accounts of SROI (see, for example, Emerson et al., 1998; Emerson 
& Twersky, 1996) we identified an indicative set of the significant historical events in 
the history of REDF and SROI (Van de Ven & Poole, 1990). We collected these events 
into a timeline (Appendix A). At the second stage, we approached actors whom the 
historical records indicated played key roles in the emergence and development of 
SROI.  
Our primary data source is documents, particularly those pertaining to REDF 
and its development of social enterprise and SROI. We obtained documents from two 
sources. The first source is publicly available documents. Given its leading role in 
developing and promoting social enterprise and later SROI, REDF produced and made 
public numerous documents, such as those outlining its views on social enterprise, as 
well as SROI reports, reports on pilot studies, and various SROI methodology guidance 
documents. In addition, we collected books and other documents on social enterprise 
and SROI written by actors at REDF. We gathered these documents based on a 
systematic web search, a search of WorldCat, and based on suggestions from our 
interview subjects. Appendix B provides a list of the publicly available documents 
analysed in the study.  
The second source is over 20 proprietary documents our interviewees provided 
to us pertaining to work they had done on SROI, such as draft versions of SROI reports 
and methodology documents, documents elaborating the data collection and reporting 
systems they developed, as well as Excel spreadsheets used by participants to perform 
early-stage SROI calculations and analysis.  
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To complement our documentary sources, we also gained access to conduct 
eight in-depth interviews with actors who were involved in REDF’s development of 
SROI. Given our research question is focused on entrepreneurs’ construction of new 
accounting methodologies, we targeted those actors at REDF who were centrally 
involved in the formulation of SROI, as described in the documents and other 
publications recounting the history of REDF. We also followed purposive and snowball 
sampling principles (Morse, 2010) using information from interviews to identify and 
contact additional informants who were reported to have played a part in the historical 
events (Thompson, 2000, p. 151). At the time of our approach for interviews, it had 
been over 10 years since REDF had produced its SROI methodology, and many of the 
informants had moved on to other jobs and were no longer employed at or involved 
with REDF. As such, although the total number of interviews is relatively small, in such 
a context we were able to obtain access to many actors who played a central role in the 
development of SROI at REDF. In particular, many of the interviewees included in our 
study were those involved in writing the publicly available books and other reports we 
collected on REDF and its promotion of social enterprise and development of SROI.  
Because our interview subjects were located across locales, we opted for using 
telephone interviews. The literature indicates that while telephone interviews do not 
reveal nonverbal cues and the immediate context (McCoyd & Kerson, 2006; Novick, 
2008), the quality of data collected using this method is similar to face-to-face 
interviews (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004; Sweet, 2002). Interviews were conducted 
between November 2012 and February 2013, lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours, 
and were digitally recorded and then transcribed in full. We use pseudonyms to protect 
the identities of our interviewees (but refer to other actors that were not interviewed by 
name, such as George Roberts, where done so by our interviewees). We followed a 
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semi-structured interview protocol asking questions about the respondent’s work 
history, their involvement with REDF and SROI, and in particular we focused on 
understanding their account of how SROI developed and their role therein. These 
interviews often expanded to include other topics of interest that respondents deemed 
relevant to this list of initial questions. Appendix C provides a list of interviewees, 
including their current job role, the type of organization in which they currently work, 
their prior work roles as they relate to REDF, and their location. 
Data analysis 
Our goal was to identify the dynamics related to the development of SROI, as we trace 
how the entrepreneurs aimed to develop the methodology to demonstrate the value of 
social enterprise as a new organizational form. We coded the documents and interviews 
employing an emergent methodology with a focus on actor-presented themes in the data 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To analyze this data, we focused our data collection and 
analysis on the underpinning processes involved in developing and deploying the new 
accounting methodology.  
 The design of our analysis of the case of REDF and the new organizational form 
of social enterprise was based on our awareness that the process we describe is 
embedded in a complex, historical narrative, where differing and potentially conflicting 
motivations unfolded. Hence, we tried to collect, whenever possible, several data points 
for each of the events we identified as potential turning points in the process to produce 
a more comprehensive picture of the organization’s efforts (Abbott, 1992; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). For example, we triangulated data from the interviews with draft 
documents prepared by the same interviewees and final versions of the same 
documents. Furthermore, when different actors or documents referred to the same 
events, we tried to reconcile differences in the versions (if such variation was exhibited 
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and was significant). On several occasions, we sent the transcripts of the interviews 
back to interviewees and asked for more details and/or additional clarifications.  
As our interviews took place over 10 years after the events we analyse, they may 
suffer from informants’ inability to recall events or to do so in particular ways. We 
addressed this concern in three ways. First, as noted above, the primary data source in 
our study is documents rather than relying only on interviews. Second, prior to 
conducting the interviews, we used our documents to construct a detailed understanding 
and timeline of events in the history of REDF and SROI coinciding with the events 
discussed during interviews (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). As such, during interviews, we 
used this understanding to prompt participants for further detail and/or refer them to 
relevant examples or illustrations to aid or nuance their descriptions and explanations. 
Third, in our data analysis, we placed more evidential weight on documentary sources, 
and avoided, where possible, relying on accounts of events or issues that emerged only 
from interviews.  
 Throughout the data analysis process, we compared our emerging themes 
regarding the key actor’s efforts with existing research to identify the extent of 
correspondence between our data and the insights from prior research and theory. In 
particular, we highlighted issues that did not appear to fit with past scholarship for 
further investigation. This process was iterative throughout the research and ended 
when we believed we had generated a plausible and consistent fit between our research 
questions, data, and theory. 
In the next section, we identify the entrepreneurs in our case, which consisted of 
the individuals affiliated with REDF. We then outline the steps involved in these actors’ 
decision to develop a new accounting methodology, including how REDF staff sought 
to develop an infrastructure that could produce numbers to convince sceptical 
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stakeholders of the value of social enterprises. Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
process.  
[Figure 1 here] 
Findings 
The value of social enterprise 
Social enterprises are organizations that pursue a social mission while relying on 
commercial activities that sustain their operations (Mair, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014).  
While organisations pursuing both a social and economic purpose have existed in one 
form or another for some time, the category of social enterprise became prominent in 
the 1980s and 1990s, following a decline in government funding of nonprofits in the US 
and UK and the turn to a neoliberal logic that embraced market-solutions to social 
problems (Kerlin, 2006). Emerging out of the nonprofit sector in the 1990s, social 
enterprises attempt to employ market methods in order to ensure clients’ equitable 
participation in the economy while at the same time relying on sales revenue (rather 
than grants or donations) for income (Barman, 2016).1 
The entrepreneurs in our case consisted of those individuals and organizations 
affiliated with REDF, a grant-giving nonprofit organization among the first in the 
United States to fund and promote social enterprises as a new organizational form to 
solve the social problem of chronic homelessness. The origins of REDF can be traced to 
the work of the Roberts Foundation, a private family foundation in San Francisco 
formed in 1986 by George Roberts – the co-founder of the global leverage buyout firm, 
                                                 
1
 Given our focus on the specific case of REDF and SROI, we do not elaborate the broader history and 
events related to the emergence of the category of social enterprise. For further information, see, for 
example, Battilana and Lee (2014) and Barman (2016).  
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Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co – and his wife, Leanne Roberts. In 1989, the foundation 
moved to centre around George Roberts’ commitment to a ‘free enterprise approach to 
homelessness’ by giving grants to Bay Area nonprofits (Emerson & Twersky, 1996, p. 
i). In 1997, the Roberts Foundation decided to emphasize the efforts of social 
enterprises to address homelessness in the Bay Area by creating a new foundation: The 
Roberts Enterprise Development Fund (‘REDF’). The actors involved defined a social 
enterprise as ‘a revenue generating venture founded to create economic opportunities 
for very low-income individuals, while simultaneously operating with reference to the 
financial bottom-line’ (Emerson & Twersky, 1996).  
The Roberts Foundation supported social enterprise as a new organizational 
form for both social and economic reasons. First, by providing clients with a 
combination of paid services, training, and long-term employment, social enterprises 
were perceived by REDF staff to best ensure that individuals would gain the skills 
required to obtain meaningful and permanent employment in the labour market 
(Emerson & Twersky, 1996; REDF, 2001). Second, social enterprises were expected to 
produce enough profit to be self-financing by selling products and services, as opposed 
to the uncertain, short term support upon which foundations or government agencies 
were reliant (Emerson et al., 1998; Tuan & Emerson, 2000; Tuan, 2002). 
As part of their championing of this new organizational form, REDF staff sought 
to convince other stakeholders, in particular The Roberts Foundation, that the social 
enterprise model could effectively assist the homeless and be economically viable. 
REDF did so by not relying only on the rhetorical framing of the dual economic and 
social value of social enterprises but also by generating representations that support 
their case. Their motivation to provide this ‘objective information’ (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005, p. 36) related to the staff’s belief that there had ‘been little evidence’ 
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social enterprises could succeed (Tuan & Emerson, 2000), given that ‘community 
economic development efforts focusing upon job creation by non-profit organizations 
had what many felt was an extremely poor track record’ (Emerson & Twersky, 1996, p. 
1). As a consequence, while REDF staff saw the value of social enterprises, they felt 
that audiences, including other funders and organizations involved in the problem of 
homelessness in the area, would be sceptical given the lack of existing proof of this new 
organizational form’s success in providing a financially sustainable way to solve the 
problem of chronic homelessness.  
Lack of appropriate accounting methods to demonstrate value 
The precise challenge for REDF staff was to measure the value of social enterprises 
both in terms of their financial sustainability and in terms of their ability to provide 
meaningful economic opportunities to clients who were chronically unemployed (Tuan 
& Emerson, 2000). As Melissa, who worked at REDF at the time, recalled: 
And the big question was, all right, if we think that nonprofits [who own social 
enterprises] run the most successful potential strategy, can we actually demonstrate that 
that’s true? From a financial standpoint—are they sustainable businesses? And then 
from a social standpoint, once that individual’s hired and keeping with these businesses, 
are they really improving their lives?  
REDF also believed that demonstrating value was important because ‘many of the 
returns created by social purpose enterprises (and many tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations) go undocumented. They are therefore largely under-appreciated by 
practitioners, funders, and policy makers’ (Emerson & Cabaj, 2000, p. 10).  
 Methods that philanthropic funders typically used to gauge the worth of 
nonprofit organizations at the time were deemed inadequate by REDF to demonstrate 
the value of social enterprises (Emerson et al., 1998; Emerson et al., 2000). Jared, a 
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senior executive at REDF at the time who had worked as director of a youth services 
nonprofit, commented:  
The fact is that in the non-profit sector at that time [1990s], if you had a program officer 
do a walk-through and you connected well and you could kind of schmooze the 
program office, you stood a pretty good chance of getting a grant [...] But, that was not 
connected to your performance. It was a question of accountability for expenditure, not 
for impact. 
REDF staff criticized methodologies like the ‘walk-through’ which typically employed 
qualitative, anecdotal information and relied on inter-personal connections as part of the 
value assessment. REDF staff regarded this approach to demonstrating the value of 
social enterprise as deficient because it did not relate the activities of the non-profit to 
their ‘performance’ or their ‘impact’ – their ability to effect social change for their 
clients (Emerson & Twersky, 1996). In effect, the prevailing evaluation norms and 
routines in the non-profit sector, such as the walk-through, focused on an organization’s 
expenditure and activities and did not provide or prioritise information on its 
performance or impact.  
In addition, REDF staff also viewed the data produced by funded social 
enterprises as inadequate and lacking comparability. Left to themselves, REDF soon 
realized that nonprofits collected ‘little reliable data on outputs (such as number of 
enterprise employees), let alone the outcomes in those people’s lives’ for their social 
enterprises (Tuan, 2004, p. 109). Sara, a long-time REDF staff member, recalled how 
her colleague expressed that the data from the funded nonprofits ‘wasn’t terribly 
rigorous, and some of it he found downright contradictory. And so he got very 
frustrated about the lack of consistency, standardization, rigor in reporting.’ This 
frustration stems from the proposed value of social enterprise not being reflected in the 
existing information systems being used in non-profit organisations (c.f. Hopwood, 
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1987; Power, 2015), with REDF’s vision for social enterprises thus being seen as 
difficult to demonstrate because appropriate evaluation routines had yet to materialise 
(c.f. Garud et al., 2014). Given the perceived inability of existing accounting 
methodologies in the nonprofit sector to generate valid data to demonstrate the dual 
social and economic benefits of social enterprises, REDF staff members decided that 
entrepreneurial innovation was called for in the form of developing a new accounting 
methodology (Emerson et al., 2000).  
Imagining: the challenge of resonating with stakeholders’ expectations  
Members of REDF were keenly aware that the success of their effort to promote social 
enterprises relied on gaining support for this innovative form of organisation from a 
broader set of stakeholders. One staff member recounted that the question REDF faced 
was: ‘[Can we] demonstrate it to ourselves, to George [Roberts], and to the field?’ This 
quote highlights the perceived necessity among REDF staff members to demonstrate the 
viability of social enterprises as financially sustainable providers of economic 
opportunities to the homeless – to ‘the field.’  
 One critical stakeholder was REDF’s key resource provider, George Roberts, 
who had first espoused the foundation’s mission of providing economic development 
opportunities for the homeless. Roberts, in spite of being a strong supporter of the cause 
of social enterprises, was at a loss when it came to capturing their performance. As a 
long-time staff member recalled: ‘we had our funder, George Roberts, who kept asking, 
“Well, how do I know that something good is happening from this? How do I know?”’ 
REDF staff also viewed government agencies as a potential funder of social enterprises 
(Emerson et al., 1998; Gair, 2009). At the time, social enterprises were considered a 
new means by which a charity could generate sustainable financial support and provide 
assistance to disadvantaged populations. Federal and local governments were engaging 
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in the marketization of welfare services as part of a broader privatization of the public 
sector, increasingly turning to charities and for-profit firms to deliver government-
funded social service programs. Thus, REDF hoped to highlight to government agencies 
as stakeholders the capacity of social enterprises to deliver publicly funded services to 
address the problem of homelessness. When asked to recount the origins of SROI, a 
senior executive at the time outlined, ‘I thought, “Who’s actually the market for this 
information?” And I thought, “I bet government agencies are the best market.”’ Also, in 
this case the innovators merely guessed that government agencies would be interested, 
but had to imagine what accounting methods may be used to capture and communicate 
the value of social enterprises to the government (Emerson et al., 2000). Finally, REDF 
believed other charitable foundations with a mission to end homelessness could be 
convinced of the merit of social enterprise (REDF, 2001; Gair, 2002). In summary, 
although it was relatively straightforward for REDF to identify its relevant stakeholders, 
far more challenging was imagining how to communicate persuasively the benefits of 
social enterprises, particularly as stakeholders, like George Roberts, did not necessarily 
know what information about the social enterprise model they would find plausible and 
credible (c.f. Garud et al., 2014).  
Beginning in 1997, REDF staff sought to design a new infrastructure that would 
align with stakeholders’ configurations of value. To do so, they imaginatively generated 
the contours of a future accounting method that they believed would resonate with 
stakeholders (c.f. Garud et al., 2014; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). In particular, REDF 
staff imagined that current and potential funders of social enterprises expected to see 
value expressed as investment returns when considering the impact of their 
philanthropic support (Emerson et al., 1998) rather than existing approaches like the 
‘walk-through’ focused on qualitative, anecdotal information. As such, the goal for 
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REDF was to appeal to stakeholders by demonstrating that a ‘dollar invested in the 
social mission of a nonprofit today generates future economic and social returns in 
excess of the initial value of that dollar’ (Emerson et al., 2000, p. 135). Recalling a 
meeting held with Roberts in 1995, Jared, the head of REDF stated: 
it dawned on me that he [Roberts] really liked what he saw, but he wasn't really clear on 
what he had bought, right? At that point, he had paid enough attention to this very topic 
- how to roll this together and assess not only whether or not you're really, at the street 
level, having the impact, but also, as an investor, as a philanthropic investor, you're 
having the impact. 
This quote shows more precisely REDF’s challenge in demonstrating value. For one, 
financial investors traditionally have judged the success of their investments by whether 
they produced monetary gain. Accordingly, REDF imagined that social enterprises 
could only be deemed successful if it could be demonstrated that the benefits – both 
economic and social – were monetized and exceeded the value of economic resources 
invested. Critically, REDF’s main funder, whose background was in financial 
investment, could not fully grasp how useful the activities of REDF’s funded social 
enterprises were.  This was because the language in which the results were initially 
presented to him by REDF staff was in the traditional non-profit model of number of 
outputs per organization – the number of services provided or clients aided – without a 
clear connection to monetized benefits, unlike the financial discourse of return on 
investment.  
 Similarly, drawing from their interactions with charitable foundations in the Bay 
Area and from broader professional discourse (Letts et al., 1997), REDF staff imagined 
that many foundations, especially other venture philanthropists, also framed the activity 
of their charitable donations through the metaphor of financial investment. ‘These new 
donors speak not only of “measurement” and “outcome funding,” but rather of “social 
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return” and the ability to document the “added-value” of their philanthropic 
investments,”’ stated one REDF publication at the time (Emerson et al., 2000, p. 132). 
Given these imagined expectations of funders, REDF began the process of constructing 
an infrastructure that would help to produce indications of value-generation that could 
plausibly and credibly convey the characteristics and benefits of social enterprises to 
stakeholders (c.f. Garud et al., 2014).  
Mobilising resources: the challenge of developing an infrastructure  
Aiming to develop an infrastructure that would collect relevant information regarding 
the financial viability and social impact of social enterprises, the entrepreneurs at REDF 
faced a significant challenge of presenting the social and economic value of social 
enterprises. In the nonprofit sector such information was not commonly collected in the 
mid 1990s and REDF witnessed a lack of suitable information systems, as well as an 
absence of appropriate accounting methodologies. Jared explained: 
Do you have a management information system in place that allows you to understand 
whether or not you're actually doing that [what you intend to do]...we knew that until 
we answer that question and these groups [the portfolio members] had good reporting 
systems in place, any discussion about impact and valuation or returns was kind of 
stupid because it was a garbage in - garbage out kind of thing.  
The quote indicates that the dual economic and social value of the social enterprises 
could not be demonstrated until suitable data collection routines were constructed and 
made operational, as the future demonstration of value depended on such data (Emerson 
et al., 1998). In particular, there was little point in talking about ‘return’ before 
acceptable data to depict the quantities of inputs and outputs were available. For REDF 
staff, given their expertise and understanding of financial notions of value and 
valuation, the development of an accounting methodology required, first, the collection 
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of suitable data. A new reporting system was needed because existing data was not 
suitable for demonstrating value in ways that would resonate with the expectations of 
stakeholders. Sara, another REDF employee, who had spent many years running her 
own business prior to moving to the non-profit sector, also echoed this understanding 
when she commented ‘what we need in the social sector is [...] the equivalent of double-
entry bookkeeping.’  
 To that end, REDF staff focused on developing an information system to avoid 
the ‘garbage in-garbage out’ view of existing nonprofit reporting methods. As such, at 
first, beginning in 1997, this process involved REDF requesting the collection of each 
social enterprise’s financial data according to a set format from each nonprofit’s 
portfolio members on a monthly basis. Draft documents from the time show that these 
reports contained financial categories, such as ‘revenue’, ‘expendables’, a comparison 
of ‘planned vs. actual sales’, along with a calculation of monthly ‘net profit.’ The 
requirements to collect and report data using such a framework reflected the ‘for profit’ 
focus of running businesses, as well as the way in which the information was reported 
in similarly formatted spreadsheets and tables for each social enterprise run by a non-
profit organization. 
 Collecting such financial data from the portfolio members, however, was 
difficult because the data REDF sought was not readily available at that time. One 
challenge was that – although owners of for-profit social enterprises – nonprofits were 
employing fund accounting (a method that tracks how resources from a funder are 
distributed by a non-profit in order to demonstrate accountability), not business 
accounting and so were not tracking the financial performance of their social enterprises 
(Tuan, 2004).  Besides employing fund accounting, another problem was that all assets 
of a social enterprise were regarded as assets of its managing non-profit organization – 
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they were not viewed as separate, stand-alone businesses. For REDF, this was 
problematic because in order to incorporate into the infrastructure a financial value of a 
social enterprises, it was necessary to establish a measurement of the financial 
performance for each social enterprise as a separate entity.  
  To do this, REDF decided to install a new information system that generated 
systematic economic data on a monthly basis for each social enterprise, as well as 
collecting additional customizable indicators (Emerson et al., 1998). The system 
necessitated reporting on a number of business and financial indicators including gross 
sales monthly, gross sales year-to-date, gross profit monthly, and gross profit year-to-
date, among others (see Appendix D). To assist the nonprofits in collecting and 
recording the right type of data in the new system involved REDF’s expenditure of the 
additional resource of employing an intern with a MBA to work with non-profits. As a 
later publication outlines this ‘business consultant spent hours each week with 
enterprise managers and nonprofit controllers teaching them about income statement 
line items, formats, and the value of cash flow projections’ (Tuan, 2004, p. 115). 
Nonetheless, despite REDF’s outlay on staff with knowledge and expertise to guide the 
data collection, REDF did early on experience challenges in gathering valid data from 
its portfolio of members given their lack of knowledge with business accounting 
(Twersky, 2002).  Proprietary REDF documents from 1999, for example, show that 
efforts to gather consistent business and financial indicators from nonprofits about their 
social enterprises often did not succeed: the scanned Excel sheets show that data was 
not ‘current’ or key cells left empty, and handwritten notes by REDF staff of ‘missing 
again!’ were common.   
  As REDF’s intended infrastructure was to generate information that would 
capture and communicate both the financial and social value of a social enterprise, staff 
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also developed a new reporting system in 1999 to track systematically the ‘social’ 
benefits resulting for individuals employed by social enterprises. At the beginning, the 
development of this reporting system, which came to be called OASIS (‘Ongoing 
Assessment of Social Impacts’), a web-based distributed ‘social management 
information system,’ focused on tracking those clients employed by each social 
enterprise over the previous two-year period (Twersky, 2002). As explained by Melissa, 
this ‘took quite some time,’ not only because the ‘infrastructure in our non-profit 
partners was limited’ such that systematic data was not currently available, but also 
because the people employed could be transient, where they could be ‘hired one day, 
and then a week later, they would resign or disappear.’  
 REDF’s ambitions for using OASIS to demonstrate the social value of social 
enterprise were much broader than counting the number of employees hired by member 
nonprofits’ social enterprises. They endeavoured to create a system to track the ‘social 
impact indicators’ (the key improvements in clients that followed after social enterprise 
employment) as they related to each employee on a systematic basis (Tuan, 2004). The 
resulting OASIS system called for collecting and inputting of up to forty indicators of 
seven key outcomes (clients’ job stability, income level, housing stability, self-esteem, 
social support system, and their usage of various social services) for all individuals 
employed by each portfolio member; each employee would complete a survey once 
every six months for two years (Twersky, 2002, p. 13). This requirement was a hugely 
expensive and time-consuming exercise, involving staff at REDF, the portfolio 
members of social enterprises, and the hiring of teams of outside consultants, enabled 
by the resources REDF had at the time (Tuan, 2004). Melissa outlined the operation of 
OASIS as follows: 
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We had this team of researchers at [external consulting firm], like maybe five of them, 
trained in different languages and skilled at finding out different types of information 
from the public health and psychiatric departments on how to track some of these 
people, to be able to find them, six, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four months later. 
This quote illustrates how REDF’s employment of OASIS required the use of highly 
skilled people, able to track down the individuals that were or had been employed by 
the portfolio members for a period of 24 months. As was the case with the collection of 
financial data, this required significant resources to employ the appropriate expertise 
and labour.  
It was only once REDF staff believed that the collected data on financial and 
social performance could not be described as ‘garbage in’ were they then willing to 
consider precisely how to demonstrate the value of social enterprises to stakeholders via 
a particular formula. In other words, the development of the data collection and 
reporting systems was never viewed as end in itself, but as a step in the larger 
entrepreneurial endeavour of creating an accounting methodology to provide an overall 
demonstration of the value of social enterprises. 
Reconfiguring: the challenge of modifying the accounting method and the 
imagined value of the innovation 
The next phase in creating the infrastructure was the development and 
operationalization of the SROI calculation to represent the value of REDF’s portfolio of 
social enterprises. To be used by each of REDF’s social enterprises on an annual basis, 
this formula calculated a ratio between the amount of financial resources invested in a 
social enterprise and a monetized estimate of the amount of economic and social value 
produced by the social enterprise. The benefits a social enterprise generates for its 
clients, in the form of economic profit and social benefit, were to be estimated over a 
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specific time horizon (e.g., 7 years) and then, employing discounted cash flow 
techniques, discounted back to their present value (REDF, 2001).  
 The shape the SROI formula took was affected significantly by the stakeholders’ 
imagined configurations of value and by the methodologies of valuation that were 
deemed valid by REDF staff and affiliated experts and consultants. Jared, the head of 
REDF, commented: 
In conversations with George [Roberts], we'd talk about...you know, I'd be learning 
about discounted cash flow and financial analysis and that kind of stuff and we would 
start, just kind of, you know, bullshitting about, 'well, how would you think about this 
from a social perspective? What are the equivalent metrics that you would use? 
To resolve this question, REDF staff sought to apply an existing and accepted 
calculative routine: return on investment (Gair, 2002). Jared stated in an interview ‘out 
my finance work [during the MBA], I was really intrigued by this idea [...] “what does 
the social return on investment look like?”’ In other words, REDF’s effort to 
demonstrate the dual economic and social value of social enterprises to key stakeholders 
borrowed the form of an existing finance formula, but expanded its content beyond 
financial value to incorporate the social value of social enterprises. However, the 
application of a return on investment schema, drawn from the field of financial 
investment to the field of social enterprise, did not proceed in a straightforward linear 
fashion with the imagined formula simply translated into the social enterprise setting. In 
particular, the entrepreneurs encountered two problems in trying to bring about their 
desired method for calculating SROI. The first problem concerned the monetisation of 
social value and the second problem revolved around deriving a measure of risk, or 
what REDF termed ‘social beta’. Both these instances show how difficulties with 
building the infrastructure required reconfiguring not only the SROI methodology itself 




Calculating social value 
The use of the return on investment formula required REDF to monetize both 
investments in the social enterprises’ operations (the denominator in the ratio 
calculation) and the resulting economic and social benefits (the numerator in the ratio 
calculation). In its SROI methodology, REDF incorporated a measure of social 
enterprises’ economic value, defined as the ‘present value of excess cash generated by 
enterprise’s business operations’ (REDF, 2001, p. 17). Enabling this calculation was 
REDF’s reconstruction of financial accounting data (as noted above) in order to 
separate the social enterprises’ assets and cash flows from the other activities of the 
nonprofit organizations.  
The entrepreneurs sought to incorporate into the infrastructure a measure to 
indicate the value of positive changes in the lives of social enterprises’ clients, who 
ideally were no longer homeless and unemployed. In a public document accompanying 
REDF’s articulation of SROI, REDF labelled this individual-level change as ‘social 
value,’ which was created when ‘resources, inputs, processes or policies are combined 
to generate improvements in the lives of individuals or society as a whole’ (REDF, 
2001, p. 12). Examples of the types of social value produced by social enterprises 
included individuals’ increased housing stability, improved self-esteem, and the 
‘psychological impact on an individual whose family has moved from welfare to work’ 
(Gair, 2002, p. 2).  
However, while REDF invested significant time and effort to collect individual 
outcome data in OASIS (as noted above), ultimately these benefits were not included in 
the calculation of SROI. The entrepreneurs’ decision to omit this data followed the 
realization that social value, although being at the core of social enterprises, was 
32 
 
deemed to encompass a wide variety of individual-level benefits, many of which were 
feared would be impossible to measure with the rigor involved in the measure of 
economic value. Most prominently, the benefits generated for individuals from their 
engagement with social enterprises were seen to suffer from two problems: they were 
hard to quantify and difficult to monetize (Emerson et al., 2000; REDF, 2001). For 
example, individuals’ accounts of desired psychological and social changes in their 
lives were viewed by REDF as inherently subjective in nature, difficult to agree upon, 
and believed to be better captured by the use of narrative rather than numbers (Gair, 
2009). Further, many of the changes produced by social enterprises in clients’ lives 
were ‘hard to translate into dollars’ (Gair, 2002, p. 3) as no existing estimates were 
available, and so ‘no matter how positive, could not be reliably monetized’ (Gair, 2009, 
p. 5). As Sara stated, REDF’s approach was ‘to be conservative and only using 
quantifiable, monetizable data,’ which meant that ‘if something could not be 
monetized…it really didn’t get counted into that number [SROI].’ For REDF, this 
situation made it impossible to incorporate social value into the calculation of SROI as 
the formula required all inputs be expressed in monetary terms. As a consequence, a 
measure of social enterprise’s social value (as defined as benefits to clients), a core 
claimed benefit of social enterprises, was difficult to capture in financial terms, and so 
ended up being excluded from the formula constituting SROI.  More generally, this 
shows how entrepreneurs may imagine benefits that prove to be difficult to demonstrate 
as they gradually materialise their proposed accounting method (c.f. Garud et al., 2014).  
 Instead, REDF reconfigured SROI by employing another measure of the value 
of social enterprises in solving the problem of homelessness, one that it labelled ‘socio-
economic value’ (REDF, 2001). A social enterprise creates socio-economic value ‘by 
making use of resources, inputs, or processes; increasing the value of these inputs, and 
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by then generating cost savings for the public system’ (Emerson et al., 2000, p. 138). 
Unlike the outcomes for social value that had no readily available and reliable 
monetized data, socio-economic value was operationalized using existing government 
data that provided estimates of the monetary savings produced by social enterprises for 
state and federal governments. These monetary savings included clients decreased net 
use of government services, such as health care, food stamps, legal services, prison, and 
food banks, and the government revenue gained in the form of taxes paid by social 
enterprise clients who had gained employment. In other words, the social benefits 
produced by social enterprises’ work with clients would be measured at the aggregate, 
community-wide or even societal level, rather than at the individual level. In this way, 
the SROI formula and the imagined benefits of social enterprise were both reconfigured 
– SROI included estimates of governmental cost savings but excluded estimates of 
individual client benefits – and instead of being seen primarily as a benefit to individual 
clients of the social enterprise, social value was reimagined as socio-economic value to 
focus on ‘community benefit’ (Gair, 2009, p. 16), a more amorphous improvement of 
general social welfare brought about by the activities of social enterprises.   
Calculating Social Beta 
A similar process was evident in other parts of the proposed SROI methodology, 
particularly in the attempts made to incorporate an element of risk into the calculation 
of social return. The entrepreneurs at REDF were motivated by the goal of 
demonstrating that investments in social enterprises can be regarded as an acceptable 
form of investment, as they imagined that REDF’s funders, whose backgrounds were in 
financial investments, would be amenable to such a demonstration of social value. In 
particular, the entrepreneurs envisioned that they would be able to present social value 
generated by social enterprises as comparable to a financial return on investment, and as 
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such, an acceptable forecast of investment in a social enterprise would include a 
measure of the risk involved, as well as a measure of return. In the social enterprise 
context, risk for the potential investor related to the way ‘certain populations are more 
difficult to serve than others...and often carry greater risk of ‘failure’ or face 
compounded challenges’ (Emerson et al., 2000, p. 149). The risk measure the 
entrepreneurs in REDF envisioned and attempted to developed was termed ‘Social 
Beta’, borrowing the concept of beta from The Capital Asset Pricing Model of financial 
economics (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965). The entrepreneurs argued that Social Beta 
would enable existing and prospective investors to compare across different 
organisations that cater to differing beneficiaries and social problems (Tuan & Emerson, 
2000).  
To obtain the relevant figures necessary for calculating Social Beta, the 
entrepreneurs started to develop a complex set of procedures for data collection that the 
social enterprises were asked to follow. Individual client data (which was collected by 
the OASIS information system) were to be fed into a calculation procedure, which was 
comprised of mapping the data onto numerically weighted degrees of risk (Emerson et 
al., 2000, p. 153). However, as the entrepreneurs began to collect actual data, they 
gradually realised they were facing significant challenges, as Sara describes:   
it’s hard to quantify [Social Beta] on several dimensions, one of them being that it’s 
hard to apply the way that the capital markets and the for-profit sector uses beta, 
because it’s a statistical number around standard deviation of failure. And when you’ve 
got a sample size of twenty, twenty-three [social enterprises], you never have a good 
statistical number. And then two, you don’t have as much definition with consistency 
around what a failure was.  
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REDF’s ‘portfolio’ entailed a limitation because of the relatively small number of social 
enterprises, which was seen to limit the statistical validity of the proposed social beta 
calculation.  
Even more challenging was the differences between how risk is conceptualised 
in financial markets and in the social enterprise context, which the Social Beta measure 
conflated, leading to perverse measurements: 
If, for example, an enterprise with an excellent management team and a highly 
profitable business (high net income) serves an extremely high-risk group, it would 
have a low Social Beta value that did not capture the riskiness of the employee 
population (REDF, 2001, p. 78).  
Indeed, many of the social enterprises in REDF’s portfolio were established specifically 
to provide employment opportunities to ‘high-risk’ individuals. As such, as they delved 
into the details of putting together the infrastructure to calculate social beta, the 
entrepreneurs realised that not only would it be difficult to obtain the necessary quantity 
of data but, more critically, they ran the risk of conceptualising wrongly the nature of 
the value social enterprises generated through casting more challenging populations as a 
‘failure’. As with case of social value, the imagined value of social enterprises turned 
out to be difficult to demonstrate with the proposed accounting method (c.f. Garud et 
al., 2014), with REDF moving away from an SROI methodology that would formally 
relate a measure of risk and return in the same way as in financial markets.  
These realisations motivated the entrepreneurs to once again reconfigure the 
SROI methodology, using an alternative measure to Social Beta, termed the 
‘Employment Risk Assessment’ (ERA) (see Appendix E). Unlike the monetary and 
forecasting qualities of Social Beta, ERA provided a set of retrospective descriptive 
statistics, concerning aspects of the target population of each social enterprise (e.g., % 
convicted of a crime), which were already collected and available through the OASIS 
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system. These statistics, the entrepreneurs explain, ‘indicate the degree of difficulty of 
finding and/or maintaining employment for people with a given set of social risk 
factors’ (REDF, 2001, p. 79) and aim to indicate to the reader of the report the value 
generated by the social enterprise by employing them (Appendix E shows the ERA 
alongside the presentation of the SROI calculations). To stress, contrary to the concept 
of social beta whereby high risk would demand higher return, a higher degree of risk in 
the ERA was not perceived as a problem, but as an indication of a successful social 
enterprise, whereby ‘enterprises serving ‘more difficult’ populations with more complex 
challenges and possibly higher possibilities of ‘failing’ can be credited for undertaking a 
more difficult task’ (REDF, 2001, p. 82). That is, the attempt to realise their imagined 
risk-weighted calculation of SROI led the entrepreneurs to the conclusion that the value 
generated by social enterprises and its means of calculation both needed to be 
reconfigured. Instead of envisioning a social enterprise as a producer of liquid return-
yielding risky assets, assets whose qualities can be forecasted effectively in advance, 
they re-imagined the value generated by the social enterprise according to their ability 
to employ ‘risky’ individuals, abandoning efforts to calculate social beta and instead 
incorporating a set of descriptive statistics about client populations into the SROI 
methodology. 
Discussion  
Our goal in this paper was to examine how entrepreneurs developed a new accounting 
methodology that helps to gain the support of stakeholders by demonstrating the value 
of an innovation. We see that entrepreneurs’ efforts to demonstrate the value of an 
innovation do not consist only of the use of rhetorical strategies (e.g., David et al., 2013; 
Maguire et al., 2004; Garud et al., 2014) but also rely on the development of an 
accounting methodology. In this process, entrepreneurs can demonstrate the value of an 
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innovation by generating numerical information that is presented as indicative of the 
innovation’s benefits (Dansou & Langley, 2013). To achieve this, they develop, 
establish and maintain an accounting methodology to demonstrate the success of the 
proposed innovation. Our analysis indicates that developing a new accounting 
methodology was shaped by entrepreneurs’ realization of key stakeholders’ scepticism 
about the proposed innovation and the inadequacy of existing accounting methodologies 
to produce appropriate data, which then presented entrepreneurs with a variety of 
obstacles and challenges to overcome in order to demonstrate the value of their 
innovation. Building from our empirical analysis, we identify three different (and 
interrelated) dimension of activity in which entrepreneurs engage in developing a new 
(rather than deploying an existing) accounting methodology to demonstrate the value of 
an innovation (see Table 1 and Figure 1).  
First, designing a new accounting method that helps to demonstrate the value of 
an innovation is predicated on imagining successfully what types of numbers would be 
regarded as persuasive by the stakeholders the entrepreneurs wish to convince (c.f. 
Garud et al., 2014; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Imagining what may be persuasive is 
vital as the stakeholders themselves, as our case indicates, may only have a general (or 
limited) idea about what type of information about the, yet non-existent, innovation they 
may find persuasive. Similarly, as entrepreneurs are seeking to demonstrate the value of 
an innovation rather than existing idea, product or service, prior experience with 
stakeholders can only offer insights of a more general nature rather than specific 
insights related to the particular innovation proposed. In existing research, the challenge 
is for actors to frame and reframe accounting numbers generated using existing, 
acceptable methods, as they discuss with stakeholders (or draw on similar past 
encounters) their proposed arguments and present their merits (e.g., Goretzki et al., 
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2018), or to work out how to operationalise existing templates in ways that stakeholders 
would find credible (Power, 2015). In contrast, to demonstrate the value of a yet-
unrealised innovation, entrepreneurs have limited resource to past encounters or existing 
accounting methods and templates, and are thus presented with the challenge of 
imagining the very kinds of numbers or templates they believe stakeholders would find 
persuasive.  
Second, our empirical examination reveals that the generation of the would-be 
persuasive numbers requires the mobilisation of resources (e.g., expertise, money and 
time) critical to the development of the infrastructure. Given its focus on the use of 
rhetoric, existing research on entrepreneurial storytelling has ignored or is largely silent 
on the scope or significance of this challenge (e.g., Garud et al., 2014; Manning & 
Bejarano, 2017). But as we saw with SROI, moving from an imagined idea of the 
benefits of social enterprise to the ability to produce information of such benefits was 
not easy. As no established procedures were available, REDF had to painstakingly 
create this information, requiring both the reconstruction of existing financial data and 
the establishment of a new information system in the form of OASIS. This creation 
process was enabled through the mobilisation of a variety of resources, such as REDF 
staff’s own expertise and experience in developing information systems, as well as 
outside help in the form of a research fellow and a team of external consultants. This 
resonates with prior research on the development of new accounting methodologies, 
where moving from an idea to its actual representation or calculation is a non-trivial 
endeavour (Hopwood, 1987; Briers & Chua, 2001; Chua, 1995; Andon et al., 2007; 
Power, 2015). This strongly contrasts with situations where actors draw upon existing 
accounting methods – their challenge is primarily related to framing and interpreting the 
numbers produced by these existing accounting methods. In entrepreneurial settings, 
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like those faced by REDF, the challenge is primarily related to mobilising resources to 
operationalise their accounting methodology, before they can even begin to offer their 
interpretation regarding the benefits of social enterprises using these numbers.  
Third, the process of designing the new accounting method requires ongoing 
reconfiguration to ensure the purported benefits of the innovation can actually be 
demonstrated by the new accounting method. As with the development of other 
accounting methodologies, the process for developing SROI was not a simple 
translation from an imagined methodology to realised calculations, but proceeded as an 
iterative process of experimentation and trial and error (Briers & Chua, 2001; Chua, 
1995; Andon et al., 2007; Jones & Dugdale, 2002; Cooper et al., 2017). In particular, 
Power (2015) notes how in this process actors can discover the meaning of ambiguous 
objects as they work to bring new accountings into being, such as the ambiguous object 
of research impact being discovered and materialized through the process of writing 
successive drafts of impact case studies. Similarly, actors at REDF discovered more 
about the purported benefits of social enterprises as they worked to bring the SROI 
methodology into being.  
But our case shows how objects may not only be ambiguous – as initially 
formulated, they can also turn out to be difficult to materialise, where constraints on 
time, money and expertise can make it difficult for entrepreneurs to bring about the 
accounting methodology they imagine stakeholders will find persuasive. For example, 
despite considerable efforts, entrepreneurs at REDF could not put in place the 
infrastructure in order for the SROI methodology to produce their imagined calculation 
of the risk-adjusted social return of social enterprises. As such, the process in our setting 
is akin to an engineering endeavour, where designers develop a product or service for an 
unknown set of customers and, as a result, the shape of the final product is an outcome 
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of an iterative and potentially costly process of trial and error. For example, as the 
entrepreneurs put into concrete form the general ideas behind the imagined accounting 
methodology, discrepancies can emerge between the espoused value of an innovation 
and the value that can actually be demonstrated through the realised accounting 
methodology. This may be because the realised accounting methodology cannot 
demonstrate fully the value of the innovation (e.g., SROI ratios not incorporating 
individual-level benefits for clients) and/or does so in ways that are potentially less 
likely to resonate with stakeholders (e.g., SROI ratios that do not provide a risk adjusted 
measure of return). Such discrepancies are clearly problematic for the entrepreneurs as, 
depending on scale and significance, they may prevent them from demonstrating the 
benefits of the innovation in ways stakeholders find persuasive. This, in turn, can inhibit 
stakeholders’ ability to understand the characteristics and benefits of the innovation, 
potentially leading to disappointments and frustrations that can threaten the ongoing 
legitimacy of the entrepreneurial endeavour (Garud et al., 2014).  
Although not observed in our study, one avenue for addressing such 
discrepancies would be to obtain more time, money and/or expertise to overcome the 
problems in putting the infrastructure in place. Whether or not this avenue is likely to 
prove productive depends on the resources available in particular contexts, but even in 
the most unrestrictive contexts, there are likely to be hard constraints on the time, 
money and/or expertise entrepreneurs can mobilise. Another avenue, and the one 
observed in our study, is for entrepreneurs to face the challenge of having to reconfigure 
the accounting methodology and the espoused value the innovation is expected to 
generate. That is, the process of developing new accountings can involve not only 
discovering more about ambiguous objects (Power, 2015), but can also involve 
transforming the nature of the object to be accounted for. As the examples of 
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calculating social value and social beta indicate, REDF’s conception of social value, 
before detailed work on realising the methodology took place, centred on the generation 
of individual-level benefits for beneficiaries, moderated by the forecasted riskiness 
involved in serving some client populations compared to others. However, when it was 
realised that putting in place the infrastructure to monetise individual level social 
benefits and the aggregate riskiness of beneficiary cohorts was difficult, the 
entrepreneurs at REDF reconfigured their conception of the social value generated by 
social enterprises (e.g. to focus on community rather than individual-level benefits) and 
reconfigured the SROI methodology (e.g., to focus on measures of governmental cost 
savings and a variety of retrospective descriptive statistics on the riskiness of different 
client cohorts). Collectively, the examples of calculating social value and social beta not 
only show the reconfiguration challenge involved as entrepreneurs attempt to put in 
place the necessary infrastructure to produce their accounting methodology, but also 
how the imagined value of the innovation can also be reconfigured in line with the 
realisation of the constraints of demonstrating it.  
Conclusion  
Our study makes three contributions. First, rather than seeking to enrol or rely on 
existing numbers (e.g., Kenno & Free, 2018; Goretzki et al., 2018; Kadous et al., 2005; 
Englund & Gerdin, 2015), we focus on how actors aim to develop a new accounting 
methodology aimed at generating persuasive numbers. The focus of the literature on the 
framing of numbers refers to a discussion between concrete actors about existing 
accounting methods and numbers (e.g., Kenno & Free, 2018; Goretzki et al., 2018; 
Kadous et al., 2005; Englund & Gerdin, 2015). We show how this process is 
qualitatively different from repurposing existing numbers so as to help in generating 
persuasive arguments, identifying and analysing three processes engaged in by 
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entrepreneurs as they seek to demonstrate the value of an innovation using an 
accounting methodology. Specifically, we showed how the process by which persuasive 
accounting numbers come about revolves around the entrepreneurs (1) imagining the 
expectations of their stakeholders (2) putting in place the necessary infrastructure 
through which the numbers could be generated and (3) iteratively reconfiguring the 
accounting methodology and the espoused value the innovation is expected to generate. 
Overall, this process we identify and analyse is not merely a rhetorical process of 
framing existing numbers, but one that comprises an ongoing interaction between the 
development of persuasive arguments and the concrete material actions needed to bring 
the proposed accounting methodology into being. At the core of this iterative process is 
the enabling (or constraining) role of infrastructure (c.f., Power, 2015), where the 
development of a persuasive narrative requires the creation of the infrastructure that can 
generate the desired numbers. Beyond our specific setting of social enterprise and 
SROI, this process may resonate more broadly with situations where actors seek to 
develop new accounting methods to demonstrate the value or importance of particular 
activities or outcomes, such as blended value (e.g., Nicholls, 2009), sustainability (e.g., 
Contrafatto, 2014), or social impact (e.g., Mook, 2013). 
Second, we contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial storytelling by 
developing understanding of the role of numbers in generating persuasive stories about 
the benefits of innovations. Despite numerous cases where entrepreneurs develop new 
numbers in order to persuade stakeholders (e.g., Déjean et al., 2004; Etzion & Ferraro, 
2010; Bermiss et al., 2013; Franks & Vanclay, 2013, Aledo et al., 2015; Bates, 2009; 
McBain & Alsamawi, 2014), prior research has not identified the exact roles that 
numbers can play in entrepreneurs’ attempts to demonstrate the value of their 
innovations to stakeholders (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007; 
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Garud et al., 2014; Manning & Bejarano, 2017). We highlight how the challenges in 
mobilising numbers are different to those in relying only on rhetoric, which can lead 
entrepreneurs to offer revised stories because the proposed methodology for persuading 
stakeholders doesn’t materialise as planned. This is important because prior research 
only focuses on how entrepreneurs offer revised stories where the entrepreneurial 
venture itself experiences disappointments (Garud et al., 2014). Our study indicates that 
entrepreneurs may also experience disappointments in realising the planned accounting 
methodology, thus identifying an additional explanation for why entrepreneurs may 
need to revise their entrepreneurial stories to gain legitimacy for their innovations 
(Garud et al., 2014). Importantly, this is not a case of entrepreneurs failing to develop 
numbers to support a pre-existing narrative (Garud et al., 2014) but instead a generative 
process whereby the entrepreneurs oscillate between the creation of projective stories 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) and the trials and experiments involved in producing the 
numbers that can form part of a persuasive narrative.  
Third, our focus on the emergence of new accounting methodologies as part of a 
broader entrepreneurial process contributes to recent analysis of how accounting begins 
(Power, 2015). In particular, it shows that when entrepreneurs are faced with situations 
where the value of their innovation is not compatible with or conveyed effectively by 
existing accounting methodologies, this can provide the motivation to begin the 
development of new accounting methodologies. As such, new accountings can begin 
not only as a response to the formation and elaboration of new objects at the field level 
(Power, 2015), but also as part of a more proactive process owing to entrepreneurial 
innovation at a localised level. In particular, our analysis necessitates a dimension of 
imagining as part of the innovative process, whereas Power (2015) emphasises 
compliance with higher-order principles that exist in the field. Our study also provides 
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detailed insight into how the phases in the emergence of new accounting forms may not 
simply unfold in a linear fashion, but influence each other dynamically and recursively 
over time (Power, 2015). Specifically, we show how difficulties in realising the 
accounting infrastructure can shape and potentially even lead to transformations in the 
formation of the objects to be accounted for. In this process, neither the infrastructure 
nor the relevant practices are regarded as stable (Power, 2015), as both can co-construct 
and potentially co-destruct one another as the new accountings evolve.  
More broadly, the study focuses greater attention on the ‘local laboratories’ 
(Cooper et al., 2017, p. 1004) from which accounting innovations initially emerge and 
the related dynamics that shape their early formation, complementing research that 
focuses on how and why particular accounting innovations become popular and in 
widespread use (e.g., Miller, 1991; Jones & Dugdale, 2002; Cooper et al., 2017). We 
add to this literature by focusing directly on the earliest stages of newly emergent 
accountings (Hopwood, 1987) by examining one such ‘local laboratory’ where a new 
accounting methodology was imagined and initially put together. Better understanding 
of these early stages in the innovation process is important because the initial contours 
of the accounting innovation can persist long after it has left the local laboratory. For 
example, although SROI did indeed change as it spread and became popular outside of 
REDF (Hall et al., 2015), many of its initial features persisted, such as the monetisation 
of benefits and the calculation of a ratio of social return. Thus, analysing the conditions 
present at the inception stages of the innovation can provide us with more complete 
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Table 1. Making numbers persuasive: using existing accounting methods vs 
designing new accounting methods 
 
Using existing accounting methods Designing new accounting methods  
Knowledge challenge - draw on prior 
experience in dealing with stakeholders to 
determine what existing numbers would be 
persuasive 
Imagination challenge - imagining the 
contours of a new accounting method that 
would convey the benefits of the innovation 
in ways stakeholders would find persuasive  
Interpretive challenge - providing new 
and/or different framing and interpretation 
to existing accounting numbers. Accounting 
methods exist and are (relatively) taken-for-
granted 
Resource challenge - mobilising resources 
(money, time, expertise) to develop the 
infrastructure to support the new accounting 
method 
Rhetorical challenge - convincing 
stakeholders that numbers are valid and 
relevant in the current setting 
Reconfiguration challenge - reconfiguring 
the accounting method and the proposed 
value of the innovation so that the benefits 
of the innovation can actually be 















Figure 1. Process for designing new accounting methods to demonstrate the 
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Appendix A: Timeline of relevant events 
Time  Event 
1986  The Roberts Foundation is formed in San Francisco 
1996  The Roberts Foundation forms the Roberts Enterprise 
Development Fund (‘REDF’), a fund aimed specifically at 
supporting social enterprises combating homelessness in the San 
Francisco Bay area.  
 REDF conducts a cost-benefit analysis of its funded social 
enterprises in the San Francisco Bay area. 
1997-1998  REDF begins to collect and compile information from 23 social 
enterprises, including reconstructing financial information.  
 REDF collects data manually using paper-based questionnaires. 
1999  REDF launches the distributed database OASIS (Ongoing 
Assessment of Social ImpactS) project 
 REDF staff and affiliated experts begin to develop the concept of 
Social Beta 
2000  REDF produces SROI reports on social enterprises 
 REDF report presents a general description of how Social Beta is 
to be calculated, as part of an explanation about SROI  
2001  REDF publishes its SROI methodology (REDF, 2001), 
including: 
o the difficulties in calculating social value, and 
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Appendix D: Indicators collected from REDF’s portfolio of social enterprises 
 






Appendix E: First page of REDF SROI Report on a social enterprise from 2000 
 
 
